It is expected that 50 more nations will eventually ratify the treaty and altogether some states including Hong Kong and Macau will eventually sign up.
Non-tariff barriers With the success of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations, attention has naturally turned to the remaining non-tariff obstacles to trade.
A non-tariff trade barrier is defined by economists as any measure, public or private, that causes internationally traded goods and services to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential real-world income. Potential real-world income is the attainable level when resources are allocated in the most economically efficient manner.
To the businessman a non-tariff barrier is any measure, other than tariffs, that provides a barrier or obstacle to the sale of his products in a foreign market.
The major non-tariff trade barriers are as follows: Quotas and trade control: These are specific limits and controls. The trade distortion of a quota is even more severe than a tariff because once the quota has been filled, the price mechanism is not allowed to operate.
The good is simply unavailable at any price. In communist countries all commodities are monopolised, but there are many examples of non-communist government monopolies: the Swedish government controls the import of all alcoholic beverages and tobacco products, and the French government controls all imports of coal. Discriminatory government and private procurement policies: These are the rules and regulations that discriminate against foreign supplies and are commonly referred to as "Buy British" or "Buy American" policies.
Restrictive customs procedures The rules and regulations for classifying and valuing commodities as a basis for levying import duties can be administered in a way that makes compliance difficult and expensive. Selective monetary controls and discriminatory exchange rate policies Discriminatory exchange rate policies distort trade in much the same way as selective import duties and export subsidies.
Selective monetary policies are definite barriers to trade. For example, many countries from time to time require importers to place on deposit at no interest an amount equal to the value of imported goods.
These regulations in effect raise the price of foreign goods by the cost of money for the term of the required deposit. Restrictive administrative and technical regulations These include anti-dumping regulations, size regulations and safety and health regulations. Some of these regulations are intended to keep out foreign foods while others are directed towards legitimate domestic objectives.
For example, the safety and pollution regulations being developed in the United States for automobiles are motivated almost entirely by legitimate concerns about highway safety and pollution. However, an effect of the regulations, particularly on smaller foreign manufacturers, has been to make it so expensive to comply with US safety requirements that they have withdrawn from the market.
In GATT published a page report listing non-tariff barriers to trade. This report, which listed such obscure items as an Italian sanitary tax on foreign snake poison, is already out of date. Packaging or pesticide regulations often erect a hurdle for exports, but not insurmountably so.
The EU has strict hygiene requirements for imports of horticultural produce for Africa which require strict observance. Producers of restrictive administrative regulations are incredibly creative in establishing barriers to trade. This can be seen in the following case3: Case 4.
Mexican tomato farmers were outraged because the regulations barred almost 50 percent of their crop from the US market.
Florida growers contended that the regulations were not discriminatory because they applied to both the Mexican and the US crops. But the Mexicans pointed out that the regulations were more lenient on green than ripened tomatoes.
Green tomatoes accounted for approximately 85 percent of the Florida tomato crop and only 10 percent of the Mexican crop. While US consumers saw prices rise as much as 30 percent, Mexican tomato framers were enraged while they watched tons of their tomatoes being fed to cattle or simply rotting in heaps along the highway. Rod Batiz, president of the 20 thousand member Confederation of Agriculture Association, was quoted in the "Wall Street Journal" as saying, "The whole of Mexico feels stabbed in the back".
The example illustrates how difficult it is to deal with non-tariff barriers to trade. The Mexicans could protest the decisions of the US Department of Agriculture, but the Florida growers who were competing with the Mexican growers, in effect, wrote their own regulations.
They maintained that the regulations worked for the benefit of everyone: growers on both sides of the border and the consumer.
A strong case could be made for the harm done by these regulations to Mexican growers and US consumers, but the mechanism for hearing this case did not really exist. The Mexican growers could influence this decision by pressuring the US government through diplomatic channels, or try to appeal directly to consumers and thereby influence legislative and administrative action in government.
An important test of a ruling or regulation is whether it has a greater impact on foreign producers. If this is the case, and there is no apparent social benefit for consumers, the ruling is a non-tariff barrier. Tariff classification Before World War II specific duties were widely used and the tariffs of many countries, particularly those in Europe and Latin America, were extremely complex.
Since the war the trend has been toward the conversion to ad valorem duties. Tariff administration has been simplified by the adoption by a large number of countries of the Brussels nomenclature BTN. This nomenclature was worked out by an international committee of experts under the sponsorship of the Customs Cooperation Council, which in produced a convention that entered into force in The rules of this convention are now being applied by most GATT countries.
Approximately two-thirds of all world trade is now conducted under tariffs based on the BTN system. The BTN groups articles mainly according to the material from which they are made. For less-developed countries, it is both easy to use and applicable to the goods they produce. An additional advantage of the BTN is its widespread use. These strategies, while neutralizing resistance and enhancing commitment, run the risk of altering regulatory goals. The Shaping of 'Marketized' Forensic Science Abstract The integration of science into policing functions continues to be a subject of considerable official concern.
Sociological study of forensic science has demonstrated great promise in illuminating the dynamics of the law-science relationship, but has yet to be fully extended to issues relating to policing.
This paper seeks to address the importance of extending research activity in this area by addressing the effects of broader political and economic trends on the development of forensic science and its use in criminal investigations. It focuses on the influence of 'liberalizing' policies on policing functions, which have extended to the provision of scientific support to the police. Forensic scientific services in England and Wales are now procured via a market-led system, and an economic imperative can be seen to have permeated strongly into this domain.
With recourse to examples of a series of initiatives, I show how the application of liberalizing processes has permeated into the science-police relationship in various ways, leading to the emergence of assemblages which serve to differentially reconstruct the relationship between forensic scientists and their chief 'customers', the police. I argue that these differences in reconstruction reflect ongoing tensions between two different interpretations of scientific integration - one which is science-led and another which is police-led.
Drawing upon these examples, I demonstrate how these tensions manifest themselves, but also show how these two interpretations co-exist. I show how an exploration of these initiatives aids understanding of how science, policing, and liberal modes of governance co-evolve. From today's perspective it would have been easy to foresee and at least partly prevent the mischief of cybercrime.
One therefore wonders what early developers and users of the Internet actually envisioned, and how malpractices such as spreading damaging viruses relate to these visions. This essay approaches this question by interpreting cybercrime as an unintended consequence of the utopian dreams that flourished during the early days of the Internet. In itself a highly innovative activity, cybercrime can be seen as an ironic counterpart to the expectations of an egalitarian cyberspace whose technical and social norms condemned discrimination against any type of applications and uses.
Jeanette Hofmann ISBN 0 8 DP 61 Anatomy of a Disaster: Why Some Accidents Are Unavoidable Abstract This paper looks at the fateful fuselage failure of Aloha Airlines Flight to suggest and illustrate a new perspective on the sociology of technological failure and the question of whether such failures are potentially avoidable.
Drawing on core insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge, it highlights, and then challenges, a fundamental principle underlying our understanding of technological risk: idea that 'failures' always connote 'errors' and are, in principle, foreseeable. From here, it suggests a new conceptual tool for Disaster Theory, by proposing a novel category of man-made calamity: what it calls the 'Epistemic Accident'.
It concludes by exploring the implications of Epistemic Accidents and sketching their relationship to broader issues concerning technology and society, and social theory's approach to failure. Yet, current policies emphasise the need to ground policies on evidence. This paper studies the tension that remains in decision-making processes when evidence is weak or 'silent' due to the sudden or unpredictable course of an event.
The main focus is on the so-called 'known unknowns', factors of which we have only limited or weak evidence in the pandemic risk assessment processes. These processes cover, for example, monitoring the course of the pandemic, estimating the most affected age groups, and assessing population-level pharmaceutical interventions. This paper conceptualises the 'unknown' within these processes as silence of evidence.
As the case of pandemic risk assessment shows, a new, emerging situation has not yet accumulated a robust body of evidence for decision making.
These uncertainties are conceptualised as silent evidence. In a similar way, historical and archaeological studies acknowledge that there is evidence that is not yet discovered, interpreted or found. This paper develops a new way to look at unknown factors that affect risk assessment under a pandemic by focusing on the tension that remains in decision-making processes under pressure. It identifies the main variables and mechanisms through which regulatory policy may influence individual choices.
The article builds on Siegwart Lindenberg's goal framing theory. The theoretical argument is supported by an extensive range of examples borrowed from the empirical literature on regulatory compliance. As such, it fills an important lacuna of compliance studies: the absence of a formal theoretical base capable of encompassing the numerous findings of the empirical literature.
The theoretical framework also gives a consistent account of the cumulated influence of heterogeneous motives on non compliance decisions, and thus provides a better understanding of responses to regulation than there was before. It studies the case of the international standard for risk analysis in food safety. The main argument of the paper is that the creation of one standard in one particular arena can reflect a diversity of relations to centrally composed rules and projects of harmonization, or regulatory languages.
Beyond that point, regulations established via laws enacted by Congress are actually implemented by executive agencies, not by Congress. It is not clear that relocating ultimate authority to the Congress would help improve the quality of regulations, in practice, in the real world. On the other hand, Congress mandates new regulations, and in its decision-making needs to understand whether a new, cost-effective regulation is achievable.
An Overview of U. Regulatory Policy Regulations affect all sectors of the U. Some major aspects and sectors of the U. The past decade has been economically tumultuous and challenging, and there is plenty of finger pointing at the government for not doing the right thing in various areas of policy.
Both since and as a result of the financial crisis, there has been increased concern that the burden of regulation is unnecessarily holding back economic activity. There is also recognition that policies must strike the proper balance between the often competing goals of: i promoting the stability and longer-term growth of the economy which suggests avoiding imprudent risk-taking, and addressing the fiscal outlook , and ii continuing to support the current cyclical shorter-term recovery which implies policies that may encourage risk taking and deficit spending.
This tension between economic goals means that in developing and establishing regulations, policy makers will often need to consider whether imposing a regulation that is believed to have long-term social and perhaps nonmonetary benefits is worth its short-term economic risks and costs. This is typically a tradeoff that is both challenging to measure and difficult to make. One possible measure of such administrative burden is page counts, as shown in Figure 3.
Public attitudes about the burden of regulation may be flawed through reliance on opinions of persons not directly involved in the process. How Does Regulation Affect the Economy? The effects of regulation on economic activity are difficult to measure and thus too often are neglected in the debates over economic policy.
He continues to explain that: The public discourse on economic policy is overwhelmingly focused on fiscal measures, monetary interventions, welfare programs and other such highly visible instruments of government action.
Thus when an economy does poorly, a disproportionate amount of our debate centers on whether or not it needs a fiscal stimulus, whether there should be liquidity easing or tightening, whether its welfare programs have been too profligate or too paltry and so on. The laws that determine how easily a business can be started and closed, the efficiency with which contracts are enforced, the rules of administration pertaining to a variety of activities—such as getting permits for electricity and doing the paperwork for exports and imports—are all examples of the nuts and bolts that are rarely visible and in the limelight but play a critical role.
Although the lack of effective methodologies for forecasting the macroeconomic and dynamic impacts of regulation may be the biggest problem facing regulators, the intentional dismissal of the cost of job displacement remains a real shortcoming of agency efforts to promote only those regulations where the benefits are worth their costs. Diana Thomas concludes that regulation of health and safety in consumer products ends up a regressive policy—placing disproportionate burden on lower-income households by driving up the prices of consumer goods and driving down wages.
Ip also emphasizes that regulations designed to tamp down risky behaviors widely deemed to be bad can often tamp down economic activity universally considered to be good. What kinds of evidence can and should be gathered and considered to evaluate the likelihood of success before a regulation is established?
In other words, justify a role for government, find the approach regulatory or otherwise most likely to improve the economic outcome and maximize net benefit to society, and then consider and address and adjust if needed any undesirable distributional effects. These would be the steps an impartial economist would take in building a smart regulation, but of course, impartial economists are not the ones who propose, vote on, or implement regulations. Economists are on the sidelines, ready to analyze when asked the economic effects of regulations already in motion or in place.
There are both data and analytical limitations: Federal agencies currently do not do a good job of monitoring and measuring the effects of regulations and collecting data along the way for later analyses. Having to compare effects at different points in time involving discount rates , place values on human life, and deal with uncertain outcomes is technically complicated. Robert Hahn has argued that not enough progress has been made in the actual, evolving practice of regulatory assessment in terms of the rigor and quality of economic analysis and its potential to improve regulatory policy.
Although all regulations must at least implicitly pass a society-wide cost-benefit test, measurement especially of benefits and especially in the case of social regulations can be extremely difficult.
Given the limits of available knowledge, benefits can be highly uncertain. Furthermore, it is in the nature of many regulations to require investment-type activities, which provide their uncertain payoffs years in the future. Thus, even if those benefits were known with certainty which they are not decision makers still could disagree over how many future dollars of benefit are required to justify one dollar of current cost.
Still further, because those remote and uncertain benefits often include claims of the saving of human lives, those decision-makers are caught in the analytical and ethical quagmire of valuing a human life, under various combinations of controversial circumstances. The same of course can be true of the valuing of avoidance of injury or illness. Environmental regulation is a good and large example: the economic costs of environmentally motivated regulatory policies in terms of reduced economic output activities that explicitly enter GDP are much easier to put dollar values on than are the environmental benefits.
Thus, although approving or rejecting a proposed regulation is inevitably and implicitly passing judgment on a cost-benefit test, in many instances that judgment will of necessity be highly controversial.
The broad role of regulation. A perspective that considers only the potential damages of regulations to the economy and employment is far from complete, and can lead to a distorted view of their implications. Indeed, many regulations have the explicit intention and effect of aiding the economy and strengthening particular industries, thereby securing jobs. Three recent events should have made clear the dangers of the narrow view that regulation causes economic harm.
Eight million jobs were lost in the Great Recession, and the labor and housing markets remain painfully weak.
Even Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from to and a leading proponent of market self-regulation, has admitted that this approach failed during the crisis. In a speech before the American Economic Association on how the bubble should have been prevented or controlled, current Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke emphasized the importance of stricter and more strongly enforced mortgage regulation.
A second recent event reinforcing the importance of sound regulation to the economy and employment is the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill of The third example of how sound regulation can aid the economy is the passage of the Food Safety Modernization Act in December This confidence had been shaken by a series of high-profile incidents of tainted food and by the 48 million cases of food-borne illnesses in the United States each year. Of course, regulations may have significant compliance costs, but costs may be warranted if the rules will produce even larger economic and social benefits.
To assess this balance, the Office of Management and Budget each year prepares a cost-benefit report on regulation. On average, the value of the benefits was about seven times the cost. An earlier OMB report examined all social regulations in effect as of and likewise found that the benefits far exceeded the costs. In March the Environmental Protection Agency released a congressionally mandated report on the costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act Amendments of In alone, an estimated , lives were saved by the Clean Air Act Amendments of Taken together, the OMB and EPA studies demonstrate an unmistakable pattern: Over the past several decades the benefits of regulations have consistently and significantly exceeded their costs.
Section 2. Assessing possible economic downsides of regulations. Opponents of regulation often advance the theory that the primary effect of regulations is to harm the economy and employment. They argue, for instance, that regulations raise costs for firms, thereby raising the costs of products, thereby leading to a reduction in sales and employment.
But a one-dimensional theory is insufficient to capture how regulations affect markets and the economy. Regulations can be designed to explicitly benefit the economy and particular industries, and they can lead to investments that create jobs, improve worker health and thus productivity, and spur important technological innovations, among other positive effects. The multidimensional effects of regulations on employment are reflected in the mixed impacts found in the studies of economic regulation.
This section first reviews studies of economy-wide effects of regulations. The most common general studies are of environmental regulations, and these have consistently failed to find significant negative employment effects.
Moreover, studies suggesting that regulations have broad negative effects on the economy offer little persuasive evidence. A second type of study examined in this report looks at the effects of particular regulations on particular industries. A surprising number of such studies actually show that regulations have a small positive net effect on employment; these include studies of environmental regulations on industries generating significant pollution.
Some well-executed studies have found that certain regulations led to job losses in particular areas, but most studies of various industries suggest that regulations had either a close to neutral or small positive effect on employment levels. A third kind of study examined here reviews trade and regulations. Here, as well, the evidence is not consistent with the simple theory that regulations raise costs for firms in this country, undercut their competitiveness with firms in other countries, and lead to the transfer of jobs to countries with less stringent regulations.
The possibility of a regulation undercutting the competitiveness of U. This report also examines the most direct government data on the extent of job loss from regulations. Over this period, only a tiny fraction of such job layoffs about 0. Section 3. Reviewing studies cited during regulatory debates. Studies of the reliability of government cost estimates of proposed or final regulations show that these estimates are often exaggerated.
One notable study published in by researchers from Resources for the Future examined 21 federal regulations for which prospective ex ante and retrospective ex post cost estimates were available.
They found that government cost estimates of 13 regulations were significantly overstated when compared with the actual costs, while the cost estimates for only three regulations were significantly understated.
An update of this analysis in by one of the researchers confirmed this general conclusion: Cost predictions used by government agencies tend to be too high. These findings are further reinforced by similar results of an earlier Economic Policy Institute study of the regulation of pollution, as well as findings of an Office of Technology Assessment study of rules established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
In both cases OTA explained that the lower-than-expected costs were partly due to unexpected gains from innovations and new technologies. In fact, the role of unanticipated technological advancements in lowering compliance costs is a strong and consistent finding in studies of government regulations. The track record of opponents of regulation in calculating cost estimates has been particularly poor. Among the examples described in this report are industry estimates for the costs of regulations related to acid rain, air bags, benzene, catalytic converters, and automobile air conditioners; all were substantially overstated.
The report also discusses industry studies that make inaccurate negative claims about the effects of specific regulations on employment levels, such as a recent U. Chamber of Commerce study of state employment regulations that relied on a fundamentally flawed statistical model. In a speech to the Chamber of Commerce in February , President Obama described the biased track record of the predictions used by opponents of regulation.
He mentioned three examples—the creation of the Food and Drug Administration, the establishment of seat belt regulations, and the enactment of child labor laws—in which opponents inaccurately forecast doom in the wake of regulatory steps. Not every industry or government prediction, of course, is necessarily off the mark.
Nonetheless, in discussions of proposed regulations, it is important to bear in mind the tendency for their estimated costs to be exaggerated. The ongoing debate. This concern, however, should not lead to unjustified efforts to weaken government regulators and regulations. Careful review of the available evidence indicates that regulations do not tend to significantly impede job creation.
To the contrary, the evidence shows that an emphasis on deregulation can contribute to enormous economic dislocation. Moreover, regulations have generally and consistently struck a reasonable balance, with their benefits to health, safety, and well-being far exceeding their costs.
Section 1. The broad role of regulation Well-crafted regulations serve many purposes. They protect people from harmful products, ensure prudent use of natural resources, and safeguard the environment. They can prevent national and regional economic disasters, and can strengthen particular industries.
They also play a critical role in structuring the economy and paving the way for innovation and competitive markets. This section of the report first examines the ways in which regulations can aid the economy and employment, and then investigates the general benefits and costs of regulations.
Sound regulation, economic prosperity, and employment Well-designed and strongly enforced regulations are often necessary for the economy to operate effectively, a proposition supported by the history of regulation, including three recent examples. First, the absence of strong regulation was a primary cause of the financial crisis that has produced such severe economic pain.
Second, the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which led to widespread environmental and economic damage in and around the Gulf of Mexico, occurred in the context of stunningly lax regulatory oversight.
Regulatory failures and the financial collapse. Sophisticated law existed in Ancient Rome. In the European Early Middle Ages , law and standardization declined with the Roman Empire, but regulation existed in the form of norms, customs, and privileges; this regulation was aided by the unified Christian identity and a sense of honor in regard to contracts.
Beginning in the late 19th and 20th century, much of regulation in the United States was administered and enforced by regulatory agencies which produced their own administrative law and procedures under the authority of statutes. Legislators created these agencies to allow experts in the industry to focus their attention on the issue.
The last part of this section, and the report, takes a look at industry and other studies. Markets are at the center of every successful economy. The most important patent agreement is the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, first signed in and now honoured by 45 countries. Regulations issued by the executive branch affect every aspect of our lives. And so out of that came this notion that we could see not a conflict between environmental regulation, strict environmental regulation, and competitiveness, but we could actually see … that these things could actually reinforce each other.
This still begs the question of which tools will be applied under different circumstances.
The analysis reveals patterns of rapid diffusion. As the case of pandemic risk assessment shows, a new, emerging situation has not yet accumulated a robust body of evidence for decision making. Regulations may also have cross-industry benefits. In other words, regulations in practice do not always make things better: Regulations are indispensable to the proper function of economies and societies. Identify cross cutting regulatory issues at all levels of government, to promote coherence between regulatory approaches and avoid duplication or conflict of regulations. While the regulatory regime has been described in literature, the response of universities remained greatly unknown.
For instance, since about 1. Taken together, the OMB and EPA studies demonstrate an unmistakable pattern: Over the past several decades the benefits of regulations have consistently and significantly exceeded their costs. The compliance and enforcement process is also facilitated by Compliance Assessment Plans CAPs and the Compliance Classification Scheme CCS , which provides consistency across different regulatory regimes in the reporting of non-compliance with permit conditions and the action the Agency takes. Anti-dumping is the worst form of protection because anti-dumping creates uncertainty for producers and intermediaries, one needs not be "guilty" to be penalized for it. The classification of a product can make a substantial difference in the duty applied.