The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large co entries because there will be more representative chosen by a greater n umber of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to De chive the people.
Representative government is needed in large country s, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule Of the mob. In large republics, factions Will be numerous, but they Will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to c insolate their strength. In this country, leaders Of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies to promote, for example, specifically delegated to it; the states, far from being a abolished, retain much of their sovereignty.
Fifth framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate tee objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present t hearten states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have on e boundary next to territory owned by a towering nation.
The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; t hey may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capita l, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.
For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandonment of the idea of combing together in strength the States still have common interests. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establish nag limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast is zee Of the country and the existence Of the sates as active political organisms.
He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself f sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to Guarani tee both libber and security. His effectiveness as an advocate oaf new constitution, and oft he particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in , avgas CE attain based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his p arsenal knowledge of the conditions of American in Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power.
Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute and irresponsible state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to guarantee both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in , was certainly based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in But Madison's greatness as a statesmen rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience in the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.
His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests could be made a guarantee of stability and justice under the new constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite.
It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in , that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay Hume disclaimed any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments which seemed to serve imperfect men so well.
Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world.
The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest.
Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic. In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own.
Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April , eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights?
Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party. When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America.
Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense.
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.
It may even be necessary to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.
An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor alone sufficient.
On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger department, by which the latter may be led to support the constitutional rights of the former, without being too much detached from the rights of its own department?
If the principles on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a test.
There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part.
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other that the private interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general. It is the end of civil society. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob.
To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. Each branch of government is framed so that its power checks the power of the other two branches; additionally, each branch of government is dependent on the people, who are the source of legitimate authority. Each branch should be self-sufficient, but each should have some kind of power over the other in order for them to keep each other from taking over the government.
He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions. But Madison's greatness as a statesmen rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience in the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man and we must deal with their effects and accept their existence. Federalist Paper 51 proposes a government broken into three branches: Executive, Legislative, and Judicial.
Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union.
In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandonment of the idea of combing together in strength the States still have common interests. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. Federalist Papers: No. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state.
Men who are members of particular factions.
Almost every state, old and new, will have on e boundary next to territory owned by a towering nation. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April , eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Federalist Paper 10 is all about warning the power of factions and competing interests over the United States Government.